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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the economic relations between China and 
new E.U. member states and Western Balkan countries. China is an 
important trade partner for these countries, but in recent years the 
cooperation has been extended to include Chinese foreign direct 
investments (F.D.I.) inward investment. Using the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (P.P.M.L.) method to estimate a gravity model of 
bilateral trade, this study analysed the export flows of these countries 
as a function of total inward F.D.I. and Chinese F.D.I. as well. The results 
imply that F.D.I. inflows from China significantly increase the bilateral 
exports of the investigated countries, where F.D.I. has a greater impact 
on the exports of new E.U. member states than on Western Balkan 
countries.
1. Introduction
Large inflows of foreign direct investment (F.D.I.) into developing countries have influenced 
increases in efficiency, productivity, exports and dynamic economic growth. The most suc-
cessful example of foreign investments inflows and export growth is China. Specifically, 
Chinese membership in the World Trade Organisation (W.T.O.), achieved in 2001, has 
contributed to huge inflows of F.D.I. into China, which have affected both trade dynamics 
and economic development (Drelich-Skulska, Bobowski, Jankowiak, & Przemyslaw, 2014; 
Zhang & Van Den Bulcke, 2014). In the early 2000s, China became the world’s second larg-
est destination of F.D.I., as reported in Fung, Korhonen, Li, and Ng (2008), where F.D.I.s 
were the most important tool of the economic transformation of China. Within a year of 
joining, China had taken the lead in export-led growth, based on learning by doing, adopt-
ing foreign know-how policies and practices and supported by industrial policy, as stated 
in Aizenman (2015) and Liang (2008). The huge export activity, in combination with low 
labour costs, led to increased productivity, which in turn resulted in the accumulation of 
significant foreign exchange reserves. This was the reason that China launched a simulta-
neous policy of opening up their economy. All these factors have led to increased Chinese 
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current-account surpluses and growing stockpiles of international reserves. The level of 
international reserves has reached impressive numbers. On the eve of the financial crisis, 
China’s real G.D.P. growth was about 14%, its current-account surplus had grown to 10% 
of G.D.P., and Chinese international reserves had reached almost 45% of G.D.P. prior to 
the crisis, peaking at about 50% in 2010, as pointed out in Aizenman (2015). All of this has 
made China the most popular and active investor globally.
In the early 2000s, China implemented a strategy of internationalisation, whereby Chinese 
companies were encouraged to invest overseas. By launching the Going Global Strategy, 
it became a national policy priority (Shixue, 2014). China began to seek more investment 
opportunities in global markets, viewing the whole world as a market for its goods and 
investment. The economic and political conditions of the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, and the ongoing financial crisis have become a special stimulus for Chinese officials 
to increase investment opportunities, initially in the U.S.A. and the E.U., then in Central 
and Eastern European Economies and, most recently, in the Western Balkans.
The expansion of China’s outward foreign direct investment in the first decade of this 
century was spectacular (MOFCOM, 2012). Chinese investment has been growing quickly 
in the U.S.A. and the E.U. since 2008. The main reasons were commercial, mainly driven by 
competition and structural changes inside China (Hanemann, 2014). However, over time, 
Chinese investors evaluated the business climate in the E.U. as more advantageous than in 
the U.S.A., despite the regulation obstacles they faced in dealing with the E.U. (European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2013).
Since 2010, China’s strategy has been aimed towards strengthening its relations with 
emerging economies and Central and Eastern Europe (C.E.E.). The growing importance 
of multidimensional cooperation and financial relations with the 16 countries of C.E.E. is 
considered  to be  a source of potential economic benefits for all parties  involved  (Joia, 
Huidumac, & Tanase, 2011).
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the economic relations between China and 
C.E.E. countries, which include both new E.U. Member States and E.U. candidates from 
the Western Balkans. Our special focus will be to investigate the impact of F.D.I. inflows 
on the bilateral exports of the observed countries, identifying the difference between F.D.I. 
impacts on the bilateral exports of new E.U. and Western Balkan countries and considering 
whether the markets of new E.U. members are more attractive to Chinese F.D.I. than those in 
the Western Balkan region. China is an important trade partner for these countries and, in 
recent years, cooperation has mainly been achieved in the field of Chinese F.D.I. in relation 
to inward investment. These countries are interested in the inflow of Chinese investment, 
especially at a time of crisis, when the capital inflow from traditional investment partners 
has become scarce.
Using the gravity model of bilateral trade, we estimate the export flows of C.E.E. coun-
tries as a function of the inward total F.D.I., as well as Chinese F.D.I. The gravity model of 
international trade has been extensively used in the empirical literature since the 1960s. 
This explains the bilateral trade flows as a function of economic sizes of countries, trade 
impediment, i.e., distance between them and various other factors that affect trade (com-
mon border, common language, free trade area and currency union membership, cus-
toms regime of non-tariff trade barriers, etc.). Estimating this model, we investigate the 
attractiveness of the E.U. New Member States and potential E.U. countries (in the Western 
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Balkans) for Chinese investment, as well as the effects of this investment on the exports of 
C.E.E. countries.
The paper  is organised as  follows: after  the  introduction, Section 2 presents a  litera-
ture overview. The third section discusses the economic indicators related to F.D.I. flows and 
the export performance of the observed countries. The fourth section presents the empiri-
cal model. The fifth section contains main conclusions.
2. Literature overview and background
In its first international strategy (2000–2005), China defined the following investment pri-
orities: Hong Kong, Macao, North America and Western Europe. The Western European 
market, as one of the world’s largest economic blocks,  has become very interesting for 
Chinese investors. In the early 2000s, the E.U. declared China a ‘strategic partner’ (Fallon, 
2014) and, since China’s entry into the W.T.O. in 2001, the development of trade relations 
has been facilitated significantly.
In 2011, the E.U. market attracted more Chinese investment than the U.S. market 
(Hanemann, 2014) where, previously, the E.U. has not been the number one destination 
of Chinese investment and so the trend of rapidly increasing Chinese investment in the 
E.U. matters more than the absolute amount being invested. For China, it was particularly 
important to build closer economic ties with partners with powerful economies and high 
levels of technological innovation like the European market.
Chinese investors are present in a wide range of sectors, in almost all E.U. countries, 
where the number of individual greenfield investments is substantially larger than the num-
ber of Mergers and Acquisitions (M and A), but, in terms of the value of the investment, the 
situation is the opposite (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012; Jacoby, 2014). Chinese firms are tra-
ditionally oriented towards Energy, Utilities, Mining and Infrastructure (Nicolas, 2014), 
but, with regard to Chinese investment in the E.U., the aim is to try to acquire European 
technology, know-how, brands, distribution channels and strategic assets, benefiting 
from the weak financial position of European firms during the financial crisis. Some 
authors have pointed out that China sees the E.U. as a strategic partner in several key areas: 
(a) as a market for Chinese goods, (b) as a source for advanced technology and (c) as a 
means of food security (Clegg & Hinrich, 2011; Fallon, 2014).
The E.U. economy is open to Chinese investment and many of the E.U.’s national leaders 
and government officials have openly stated that Chinese investment is welcome (Shixue, 
2014). However, in practice, Chinese companies face difficulties in investing in the E.U. 
market; this is partly due to China’s unfamiliarity with the rules of the large E.U. market, 
but also because it has been difficult for China to find suitable investment opportunities in 
the region, in part a result of negative campaigning by the media and think tanks that has 
put pressure on Chinese investors (Zuokui, 2014).
The recent surge in Chinese investment expansion in E.U. markets has already raised 
concerns in many countries with respect to national security, and the political and eco-
nomic impact  of these changes  (Hanemann, 2014; Nicolas, 2014). There are  numer-
ous worries that China may be taking control of European economies and arguments are 
often made in favour of establishing rules for the protection of local workers, wages and 
industries. On the other hand, there are issues connected with China’s exceptional size, 
authoritarian political system, direct or indirect political and financial support for Chinese 
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F.D.I.s, the under-valued exchange rates of the Chinese currency and the implementation 
of capital controls (Amighini, Rabellotti, & Sanfilippo, 2013).
In 2011, China launched a new forum for cooperation with C.E.E. countries, the ‘16+1’, 
which includes  the  11 E.U. new member counties (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and five 
E.U. candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia). These countries are different in many ways, but share the same need for invest-
ment and some common experience with China.  The relationship  between  China and 
C.E.E. (the C.E.E.-16) entered a ‘new era of cooperation’ (Tianping, 2013), where China is 
becoming an increasingly important international investor (Pencea & Oehler-Sincai, 2014).
Accompanying this  move,  in 2013, China inaugurated the ‘The New Economic Silk 
Road’,  leading from China to France, announcing a new wave of regional, political and 
economic cooperation. Since then, China  has been  investing in key infrastructure and 
logistic operations in the countries along this road. 
With E.U. enlargement to incorporate C.E.E. countries, these countries have become 
interesting markets for  Chinese  investors, as these markets have become  a ‘window of 
opportunity’ and China’s gateway to the markets of the wider E.U. (Zuokui, 2014).With their 
recently revived E.U. aspirations, the countries of the Western Balkans are also becoming 
more and more interesting for China. Cooperation between these countries and China is 
a growing trend, both in terms of investment and trade. So far, there have been four con-
secutive summit meetings of the Heads of Government of China and of C.E.E. countries 
discussing possible investment opportunities and specific projects (Warsaw, 2012, Bucharest, 
2013, Belgrade, 2014 and Suzhou, 2015).
There are important differences between Chinese investment behaviour in the C.E.E.-16 
and the E.U.-15. First, there is a lower amount of investments in the C.E.E.-16, so the region 
is a destination for green-field activity, and investment which is product-oriented, efficiency 
seeking and which provides market access (Jacoby, 2014; Nicolas, 2014).
The Chinese motivation for C.E.E.-16 investment  is  complex: these countries are all 
former communist countries and, in their nature, are different from the western E.U.-15 
countries. Studies have shown that countries that are politically, ethnically and economically 
close to China have stronger international business ties with the Chinese economy (Scott, 
2014; Shan & Wang, 2015); that is in part why China has a particular interest in investing 
in the C.E.E. region.
The growth rates of C.E.E. counties are higher than in the E.U. generally, labour costs are 
more competitive and some of the countries can act as gateways for Chinese goods to the E.U. 
One very important dimension is that all the C.E.E.-16 countries have geographical access 
to major harbours, where China intends to invest in logistic centres and industrial projects. 
All the countries of C.E.E.-16 host Chinese investment, but the Visegrad group (V-4) is the 
biggest overall recipient (Palonka, 2010;  Pencea & Oehler-Sincai, 2014).
The markets of C.E.E. countries have become very interesting for China, especially after 
the E.U. enlargement of 2004 (Tianping, 2013). This was particularly true as  the C.E.E. 
counties and China have the same background in a centrally planned economy and Chinese 
investors began to realise the investment potential of the C.E.E. region, and  especially 
the  Visegrad  countries, due to  their  specific industrial  advantages  when compared  to 
other C.E.E. countries; this is made clear by the reports of the Ministry of Commerce of 
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China, the National Bureau of Statistics of China and the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange of China (2013).
With the global financial crisis, the relationship between China and C.E.E. countries has 
strengthened. While C.E.E. countries have been suffering from the global financial crisis, they 
have turned to China, seeking economic cooperation and trade promotion (Tianping, 2013). 
According to Belka (2012), the Chinese approach towards the Visegrad countries in par-
ticular is to move the whole industrial chain to these countries to build product upgrad-
ing  and  sales centres,  regarding  the localisation of production,  with the final aim of 
selling Chinese goods on to the E.U., Russian and Turkish markets. 
In addition to the increasing importance of Central Europe, the Western Balkan coun-
tries are becoming more interesting, both for Chinese investment and export. This is particu-
larly relevant as they are countries outside the E.U., but which have signed trade agreements 
with the Union (for example Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia). They 
are attractive to Chinese companies, due to the fact that they can avoid anti-dumping and 
other similar E.U. regulations, while at the same time creating a springboard for free trade 
with the E.U. Therefore, the contribution of this paper is, in its unique research angle, that 
it observes effects of Chinese F.D.I. inflow on exports of host countries. Moreover, there is 
a lack of empirical literature on this topic. 
3. China and C.E.E. countries-F.D.I. and export
Total Chinese F.D.I. inflows to the E.U.-15 in 2015 amounted to 5318 billion U.S.D., rep-
resenting 4.2% of total Chinese F.D.I. The leading recipients were: The Netherlands and 
the U.K., followed by France, Germany and Sweden receiving 90% of total inflow. The 
recipients with the least Chinese F.D.I. were Austria, Finland and Portugal. Chinese invest-
ment is presented in Table 1, which shows F.D.I. outward investment and export value to 
the E.U.15, new E.U. members and Western Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia)in millions of U.S.D. The trends of these indicators have 
been observed for the period 2006–2015.
When we look at the export figures, China exported about 310 billion U.S.D. to the E.U.-
15 in 2015 (The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, The National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, The State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 2013 Statistical 
Table 1. chinese F.D.i. outward flows and exports to the E.U.15, new E.U. members and W.B. countries in 
millions of U.s.D., 2006–2015.
source: china customs and U.n.c.t.a.D. F.D.i. database.
E.U.-15 2006  2009  2010  2011  2012   2013 2015
F.D.i. inward/inflows 108.95 2,928.9 5,548.9 7,341.8 5,966.7 4,356.5 5,318.75
% of total chinese investments 1.2 3.1 4.8 5.9 4.9 3.5 4.2
Export 93,581 209,275 275,498 314,843 294,152 295,974 311,871
new E.U. members 
F.D.i. inward/inflows 19.2 37.5 414.2 219.0 153.2 167.0 160.6
% of total chinese investments 0 0.04 0.36 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13
Export 19,850 27,009 35,736 41,177 39,806 41,621 43,116
W.B.
F.D.i. inward/inflows n.a. 1.5 2.1 0.25 2.2 12.6 19.97
% of total chinese investments n.a. 0.002 0.002 0.00 0.002 0.01 0.02
1190   D. JACIMOVIC ET AL.
Bulletin of China’s outward foreign direct investment, China Statistics Press September 
2014). The biggest of China’s export markets were Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K., 
with 60% of the total, then France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, with their share at around 
30%. Certainly, it can be seen that the most important partner countries from the E.U.15 
are Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K.
When looking at Table 1, for new E.U. member states (Our analysis excludes Croatia as 
a recent E.U. Member), we can conclude that there is also an intensification of the relations 
between China and the C.E.E. countries. The number of investment projects and trade vol-
ume was constantly increasing in the period 2006–2015, but it still represents only 0.1–0.2% 
of total Chinese F.D.I., or 4% of the flow to more established E.U. Members States (E.U.-15). 
The total Chinese export to E.U.-12 countries is 1.2% of total export.
In 2006–2015, Hungary and Bulgaria received the largest volume of F.D.I., around 50% of 
total flows, followed by Poland, Romania and Cyprus, while Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia 
had no Chinese F.D.I. China’s exports to new member states represent 0.16% of their total 
imports. The number one destination of Chinese exports is Poland, while the Czech Republic 
is in second place, but in less significant amounts. They are followed by Hungary. The fact 
that there is no new E.U. member country that does not import from China speaks of the 
power of the Chinese economy, which is the world’s largest exporter of goods.
The inflow of F.D.I. and imports from China to the Western Balkan (W.B.) countries 
achieved 0.02% of total F.D.I. flows in 2015. Data suggests that these countries are becoming 
the subject of attention from China. Bearing in mind investment activities in Montenegro 
and Serbia in 2014, it seems that the share of Chinese F.D.I. in this region will increase. So, 
when we talk about Chinese F.D.I., they are insignificant or absent in most countries, so 
that only Serbia stands out as a recipient. (Serbia has the largest inflow of F.D.I. of U.S.D. 
11.5 million in 2013, and Macedonia of U.S.D. 11 million in 2015). China is the largest 
exporter to both Croatia and Serbia.
As for the structure of the investment in C.E.E. and W.B. countries, China invests most 
in the sectors of infrastructure and energy. Thus, China is trying to develop infrastructure 
and a distribution network in this part of the world suitable for the further penetration of 
Chinese products into the European market, in which the W.B. countries play an interme-
diary role, with the prospect that the Chinese companies will partly relocate their produc-
tion facilities to this part of the world, due to the existence of free trade agreements with 
the E.U.. That is why the focus of our analysis is the investigation of the effects of China’s 
F.D.I. on the exports of new E.U. and W.B. countries. Table 2 shows data for the exports of 
the E.U.-15, new E.U. members and W.B. in the period of 2006–2015 in billions of U.S.D.
Table 2. Export flows of the E.U.-15, new E.U. members and W.B. counties in billions of U.s.D. 2006–2015.
source: U.n.c.t.a.D. trade database and national statistics.
aData for Bosnia and herzegovina, croatia, serbia and montenegro.
2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015
E.U.-15 3,802 4,088 4,572 5,345 5,091 5,309 4,672
new E.U. members 424 654 508 599 733 709 704
Balkan W.B.a 22 12 15 18 19 25 23
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The exports data are used in order to observe the dynamic of exports for each analysed 
group of countries as a function of Chinese F.D.I., which will be investigated using the 
gravity panel data model.
4. Chinese F.D.I. and Central and Eastern European exports-empirical 
analysis
This part of the paper deals with the impact of China’s F.D.I. in new E.U. members and 
Western Balkan countries on their own bilateral exports. Precisely, in the focus of our 
analysis are the following countries which received F.D.I. from China during the period 
2006–2013: Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, The Slovak Republic, Romania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. The bilateral exports of these 
countries toward their main foreign trade partners are observed in the period 2006–2013. 
Selected main partners for all the examined countries captured at least 90% of total countries’ 
exports. This has resulted in a panel sample of 315 country-pairs (the above mentioned 
countries’ trade flows to the E.U. countries (The E.U. sample does not include Malta and 
Cyprus due to low level of trade with C.E.E.) and other important trade partners such as 
Russia, China, Turkey, the U.S.A. and Switzerland), thus making 2520 panel observations in 
the 8-year period. The source of data is the World Trade Profiles 2014 published by W.T.O. 
The choice of 2006 as the starting year of the examined period is determined by the fact 
that data for Montenegro and Serbia as separate economies exist from that year.
Our main research hypotheses are that (1) F.D.I. inflows generally has an impact on the 
bilateral exports of the examined countries, (2) there is different magnitude of F.D.I. impact 
on the bilateral exports of new E.U. members and W.B. countries, and (3) the market of new 
E.U. members is more attractive to China’s F.D.I. than the W.B. region.
4.1. The model, data and variables
The empirical analysis is based on the gravity panel data model. Apart from the standard 
determinants of bilateral trade in this model (e.g., G.D.P. and number of population, dis-
tance, common language and border, and so on), the empirical literature is often focused 
on the effects of economic integration, currency unions, exchange rate volatility, F.D.I. or 
different trade impediments on bilateral trade flows (for instance, Baier & Bergstrand, 2007; 
Bussière, Fidrmuc, & Schnatz, 2008; Faruqee, 2004; Papazoglou, Pentecost, & Marques, 
2006; Tenreyro, 2007). The basic model in its nonlinear form is as follows:
 
where Xijt is related to the export value from country i to country j in period t; Nit, Yit, Njt 
and Yjt are population and the G.D.P. of exporters and importers in the period t, Dij is 
the distance variable as a proxy for transport and transaction costs between exporter and 
importer main economic centres, a dummy variables set Aij captures the effects of common 
borders, language, cultural similarities, preferential trade agreements, currency unions and 
εijt represents the error term. (There are various alternatives to this basic gravity model, 
such as those used for analysis at a sectoral level or others that are based on different trade 
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The specification we start with in this paper is in the augmented form of model (1):
 
Apart from variables included and explained in model (1), the model (2) includes variables 
F.D.I. inflow from China (F.D.I.Chnit) and F.D.I. from the rest of the world (F.D.I.rit) toward 
selected W.B. and new E.U. member countries. In that way, the different magnitude of F.D.I. 
from China and F.D.I. from other countries on bilateral exports is measured. To alleviate the 
potential multicollinearity problem (between F.D.I. and the G.D.P. of the exporter country), 
instead of including both variables, the G.D.P. of the exporter and importer, we used a meas-
ure of the overall bilateral G.D.P. of the two trade partners (G.D.P.Tijt = G.D.P.it + G.D.P.jt
; where G.D.P.it and G.D.P.jt are the gross domestic product of the exporter country i and 
the importer country j in the year t, respectively).
Additional variables in the model are the distance variable (Dij) and dummy variable 
representing the effects of common borders (Bij) on bilateral exports, taking value 1 for 
countries that share a common border and 0 otherwise. Model (2) includes exporter (μi) 
and importer (μj) specific effects, thus encompassing heterogeneity across countries due 
to various historical, cultural and other time-invariant specific variables (Matyas, 1997). 
Finally, the model contains time-specific effects (λt) reflecting the effects of individual invar-
iant variables not explicitly included in the model.
The expected sign of the bilateral G.D.P. variable is positive, meaning that the higher the 
overall G.D.P. of the two trade partners is, the higher the level of their bilateral trade will 
be. The same sign is expected when F.D.I. variables are observed. To be specific, F.D.I. is 
expected to have significantly positive effects on bilateral trade between countries, but the 
magnitude of the effects of China’s F.D.I. inflows on new E.U. Member exports is expected 
to be higher than on W.B. country exports, due to the significantly higher amount of China’s 
F.D.I. in new E.U. Members compared to W.B. countries. As expected, distance has a negative 
effect and a common border has positive effects on bilateral exports.
Bilateral export data, measured in millions of U.S.D., originate from the U.N. Comtrade 
database and G.D.P. data (in millions of U.S.D.) are from the I.M.F. World Economic 
Outlook. Data on F.D.I. inflows are taken from the U.N.C.T.A.D. database, while F.D.I. from 
China to the W.B. and new E.U. members are from the Ministry of Commerce of China, 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the National Bureau of Statistics of Ch
ina. Data on distance between the economic centres of two countries (in kilometres) are 
taken from the website: www.worldatlas.com.
4.2. Methodology
The estimation of the gravity model in recent empirical literature is mostly based on panel 
data (e.g., Baier & Bergstrand, 2007; Bussière et al., 2008; Westerlund & Wilhelmsson, 
2011). A review of panel data econometric methods for the gravity model is given in Baltagi, 
Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2014). Commonly used panel data specifications are based on fixed 
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et al., 2008), various instrumental variable estimators, generalised least squares methods 
(Dragutinovic Mitrovic and Bjelic, 2013; Serlenga & Shin, 2007Dragutinovic Mitrovic and 
Bjelic, 2013) and so on. In most empirical studies, the estimation of the gravity model is 
based on logarithms of both sides of the model. However, when the bilateral trade variable 
contains zero values not randomly distributed, this approach is not useful as it drops out 
zero trade flows. Hence, an alternative procedure in the presence of zero dependent variable 
values is to estimate the non-linear form of the gravity panel data model using the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood (P.P.M.L.) estimator. (This method is commonly used for 
count data, but recent papers confirmed its consistency, regardless of the distribution of the 
data, meaning that F.E. P.P.M.L. could also be applied to continuous variables (e.g., Silva & 
Tenreyro, 2006; Tenreyro, 2007; Westerlund & Wilhelmsson, 2011). The method is robust 
to the presence of heteroscedasticity.)
This method has often been used in recent empirical literature to solve zero trade prob-
lems and implicitly to estimate the gravity model in its original non-linear form (2). Since 
the sample in our empirical analysis contains zero trade flows to some extent, we also applied 
the P.P.M.L. method to estimate the gravity panel data model (2). Following the results of 
Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011), this model can be rewritten as:
 
where the conditional expectation:
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4.3. Estimation results
The empirical literature presented in the previous section also shows that other solutions to 
solve zero trade values, such as dropping the data with zero values (truncating the sample) 
or adding a small value to the zero value (before taking logs) are inappropriate (even in 
the case of a small percentage of zero values), since they lead to sample selection bias when 
zeros are not randomly missing data (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006; Westerlund & Wilhelmsson, 
2011). That is why we applied P.P.M.L. in the estimation of the model, although the num-
ber of zero export values in our sample is rather small (less than 10%). The robustness of 
P.P.M.L. results in the estimation of gravity model was also checked in our recent paper 
(Dragutinović Mitrović & Bjelić, 2013), as well as in other previous empirical papers (for 
instance, Tenreyro, 2007), where it was shown that the magnitude of P.P.M.L. estimates is 
lower compared to those obtained by applying the fixed effects least squares estimator on 
linear gravity model taking logarithms.
The results of the P.P.M.L. method applied to Model (2) are presented in Table 3. Within 
the post-estimation procedure, we perform a RESET test to check whether the specification 
of the conditional expectation is correct or not. The test results (Table 3) indicate that the 
regression estimated using P.P.M.L. has no evidence of misspecification. Therefore, in the 
following we discuss the results obtained by P.P.M.L. estimation of the gravity model.
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Looking at the estimated regression coefficients of the standard regressors in the gravity 
model, the expected signs and significance are obtained. As stated previously, to alleviate the 
problem of a high positive correlation between the variable G.D.P. of the exporter country 
and its F.D.I. inflow, we used the overall bilateral G.D.P. of both the importer and exporter 
country. The income of both countries should positively determine their bilateral trade, 
which is confirmed by the positive regression coefficient of overall G.D.P. (significant at a 
1% significance level). This means that the bilateral exports of W.B. and new E.U. mem-
ber countries are positively affected by their incomes. Distance and common borders also 
have an important role in determining the bilateral exports of the examined countries: the 
distance impact on bilateral exports is negative and significant, while the border effect is 
significantly positive (Table 3).
Our investigation considered the effects of Chinese F.D.I. on the trade of W.B. and new 
E.U. members. Moreover, we compare their bilateral trade effects for the two groups of 
countries. Our results show that F.D.I. inflows from China (F.D.I.Chn) as well as from the rest 
of the world (F.D.I.r) significantly increase the bilateral exports of the examined European 
countries (the regression coefficients are 0.13517 and 0.39659, both significant at 1% signif-
icance level). In order to test whether and to what extent China’s F.D.I. has different effects 
on the bilateral exports of new E.U. Members compared to W.B. countries, we extended the 
model by including the interaction of each of the two F.D.I. variables with dummy variables 
for new E.U. members and W.B. countries (F.D.I.Chn_E.U. and F.D.I.Chn_W.B., as well as 
F.D.I.r_E.U. and F.D.I.r_W.B.). The estimation results are presented in column 2 of Table 3.
Our econometric analysis confirms all three of the main hypotheses stated at the begin-
ning of this section. Generally, F.D.I. inflows have a significant impact on the bilateral 
exports of both groups of countries (with significant regression coefficient estimates for 
both F.D.I.r_E.U. and F.D.I.r_W.B. variables). Regarding China’s F.D.I. effects, the regres-
sion coefficient estimate of theF.D.I.Chn_E.U. variable is positive and significant at a 1% 
significance level, whereas that of F.D.I.Chn_W.B. is not significant. This implies that the 
new E.U. market is more attractive for Chinese investment, that is Chinese F.D.I. has a 
greater impact on the exports of new E.U. members than they do on the exports of W.B. 
countries. There could be several reasons for such results. First, by investing in one E.U. 
Table 3. P.P.m.L. estimation results dependent variable: bilateral exports.
note: the p-value is reported in parentheses.
source: authors calculation.
Regressor P.P.M.L. – F.E. (1) P.P.M.L. – F.E. (2) P.P.M.L. – F.E. (3)
G.D.P.T 0.49532 (0.000) 0.52346 (0.001) 0.52350 (0.001)
F.D.I.Chn 0.13517 (0.000)
F.D.I.r 0.39659 (0.000)
F.D.I.Chn_E.U. 0.12485 (0.000) 0.12486 (0.000)
F.D.I.Chn_W.B. −0.01703 (0.566)
F.D.I.r-E.U. 0.2409681 (0.000) 0.24093 (0.000)
F.D.I.r-W.B. 0.28758 (0.000) 0.29025 (0.000)
Dij −0.68639 (0.001) −0.71789 (0.001) −0.71786 (0.000)
Bij 0.64785 (0.001) 0.60070 (0.000) 0.60071 (0.000)
number of observations 2520 2520 2520
Fixed exporter effects yes yes yes
Fixed importer effects yes yes yes
time effects yes yes yes
Wald test 8668.60 6650.57 (0.000) 6299.39 (0.000)
Reset test p-value 0.085 0.112 0.121
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country, a newly established company can supply the whole E.U. market, and one part of 
its production can also be exported. Second, inward F.D.I. in the E.U., under the condition 
that the newly established company fulfils the rules of origin requirements for preferential 
treatment, can open doors to many markets, since the E.U. has a wide network of prefer-
ential trade agreements. Third, Chinese investment is often attracted by the technological 
knowledge of the companies in the developed economies in which they tend to invest, in 
order to control or acquire that advanced technology.
5. Conclusion
China has moved from being the biggest F.D.I. recipient, to one of the biggest F.D.I. investors 
globally since 2000. The opening strategy supported by the Chinese government, the low 
level of labour costs and under-valued currency have made China not only the outstanding 
exporter, but also the biggest investor over recent years. Many countries have faced the effects 
of financial crisis and a lack of financial resources and E.U. countries are experiencing an 
especially difficult time.
The E.U., as a big and developed market, has always been interesting for Chinese busi-
nesses, first as an export market and recently as a market for Chinese investments. With 
E.U. enlargement, the new E.U. Member States have become interesting markets for Chinese 
investors, as this market has become China’s gateway to the E.U. market as a whole. The W.B. 
countries represent a growing area of interest for Chinese investors, due to their increasing 
integration perspectives towards the E.U.
Analysing the impact of F.D.I. inflows on the bilateral exports of the selected countries, 
the results from gravity model analysis show that F.D.I. inflows from China as well as from 
the rest of the world significantly increase the bilateral exports of both new E.U. member 
countries and W.B. countries, confirming our first hypothesis. Our second hypothesis is 
also confirmed since we identified a different magnitude of F.D.I. impact on the bilateral 
exports in the case of new E.U. member countries and W.B. countries. These results lead us 
to conclude that the market of new E.U. countries is more attractive for Chinese investment 
than the export markets of W.B. countries.
Economic theory suggests the following explanation for these results. When China 
invests in one E.U. country it aims to supply the whole E.U. market, since the E.U. is a 
unified market. If newly established companies in the E.U., created by Chinese F.D.I., ful-
fil certain conditions, they can export to many markets, benefiting from the preferential 
treatment enabled by the E.U.’s Common Trade Policy. Based on a experience of new E.U. 
member countries, we can expect that W.B. countries will be more attractive to Chinese 
F.D.I. as they move closer to the E.U. membership. Currently, a very important stimulus 
for Chinese investment is the acquiring of technological knowledge from F.D.I. recipient 
companies in developed countries.
The majority of financial outflows from China still consists of state credits that are used 
for investments in other countries. These credits have become especially significant for 
C.E.E. countries after 2012, but these flows are not captured by our research and they should 
be taken into consideration in any future research.
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